Non-technical summary
Even after the global …nancial crisis of 2007-08 started abating, the European sovereign debt crisis, concerns about US debt and worries about a repeated global economic downturn have induced a sizeable adjustment in asset prices and in the allocation of liquidity in 2010 and 2011. Yet these two crises have a¤ected countries and asset markets very di¤erently. Many observers and policymakers have pointed to the importance of shocks to liquidity and to risk in explaining the dynamics of both the global crisis of 2007-08 and the 2010-11 debt crisis. In particular the squeeze of liquidity in 2008, which implied a drying up of liquidity among …nancial institutions, forced many banks and investors to repatriate capital to …nance investment and meet redemption calls, thus triggering a ‡ight-to-safety phenomenon. However, such a phenomenon has been largely absent in 2010-11, at least until a slowdown in the second half of 2011, and in fact capital overall has continued to pour into EMEs. This paper analyses the global transmission of the 2007-08 …nancial crisis and the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis via shocks to liquidity and shocks to risk. The objective of the paper is threefold. First, we analyse how shocks to liquidity and risk are transmitted to …nancial markets globally and how they help us understand the dynamics of the two di¤erent crisis episodes. We don't only look at a broad set of 28 EMEs and AEs, but importantly, we analyse the response of asset prices (equity markets and bond yields) as well as of exchange rates and capital ‡ows in equities and bonds in order to gauge the functioning of the transmission channels. A strength of the analysis is that we are able to use relatively high-frequency weekly data to gauge the transmission of shocks through global …nancial markets, employing also relatively new data on high-frequency private portfolio capital ‡ows. Second, we speci…cally analyse how and why the 2007-08 …nancial crisis and the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis have been di¤erent. And third, we attempt to shed light on the portfolio decisions by investors, and their determinants.
A simultaneous empirical analysis of asset prices, exchange rates as well as capital ‡ows across 28 countries is far from straightforward. Altogether we have 144 endogenously related variables. Such a large dimensionality renders traditional VAR models inapplicable. We employ a relatively novel, so called in…nite-dimensional VAR methodology, …rst introduced by Chudik and Pesaran (2011b) , which allows us to treat all variables as endogenous. Restrictions to overcome the dimensionality
Introduction
Global …nancial markets and capital ‡ows have been tremendously volatile ever since the onset of the global …nancial crisis in August 2007. Even after the global …nancial crisis of 2007-08 started abating, the European sovereign debt crisis, concerns about US debt and worries about a repeated global economic downturn have induced a sizeable adjustment in asset prices and in the allocation of liquidity in 2010 and 2011. Yet these two crises have a¤ected countries and asset markets very di¤erently. Despite having the US as an origin, the 2007-08 crisis a¤ected asset prices and capital ‡ows to emerging market economies (EMEs) more strongly than those in advanced economies (AEs) as capital ‡ed EMEs, triggering a collapse in EME asset prices and exchange rates, while bu¤ering the decline in asset prices and even inducing an exchange rate appreciation in many AEs. By contrast, the 2010-11 crisis has seen a remarkable resilience of EMEs, both in terms of the e¤ect on the real economy and on …nancial markets.
Many observers and policy-makers have pointed to the importance of shocks to liquidity and to risk in explaining the dynamics of both the global crisis of 2007-08 and the 2010-11 debt crisis. In particular the squeeze of liquidity in 2008, which implied a drying up of liquidity among …nancial institutions, forced many banks and investors to repatriate capital to …nance investment and meet redemption calls, thus severely restricting the capital available to the real side of the economy and triggering a major global recession (Adrian and Shin (2010) , Borio (2009) , Tirole (2010) ). Moreover, the rise in risk and risk aversion in 2007-08 induced a ‡ight-to-safety phenomenon, which not only entailed a rebalancing towards safer asset classes, but also a massive capital ‡ight from supposedly riskier countries -foremost EMEs -to advanced economies. These large capital out ‡ows worsened the real and …nancial impact of the 2007-08 crisis on EMEs in particular. However, such a ‡ight-to-safety phenomenon out of EMEs has been largely absent in 2010-11, and in fact capital has continued to pour into EMEs. This paper analyses the global transmission of the 2007-08 …nancial crisis and the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis via shocks to liquidity and shocks to risk. The objective of the paper is threefold. First, we analyse how shocks to liquidity and risk are transmitted to …nancial markets globally and how they help us understand the dynamics of the two di¤erent crisis episodes. We don't only look at a broad set of 28 EMEs and AEs, but importantly, we analyse the response of asset prices (equity markets and bond yields) as well as of exchange rates and capital ‡ows in equities and bonds in order to gauge the functioning of the transmission channels. A strength of the analysis is that we are able to use relatively high-frequency weekly data to gauge the transmission of shocks through global …nancial markets, employing also relatively new data on high-frequency private portfolio capital ‡ows.
Second, we speci…cally analyse how the 2007-08 …nancial crisis and the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis have been di¤erent, both in the scope with which di¤erent countries have been a¤ected and in the way shocks to risk and liquidity have been transmitted. And third, we attempt to shed light on the portfolio decisions by investors, and their determinants, during the two crises by analysing portfolio choice of investors both geographically (across countries) and across asset classes in order to understand the di¤erences across crisis episodes.
An simultaneous empirical analysis of asset prices, exchange rates as well as capital ‡ows across 28 countries is far from straightforward. Altogether we have 144 endogenously related variables.
Such a large dimensionality renders traditional VAR models inapplicable. We employ a relatively novel, so called in…nite-dimensional VAR methodology introduced by Chudik and Pesaran (2011b) and later extended by Chudik and Pesaran (2011a) . This methodology allows us to treat all variables as endogenous, which is arguably a very important advantage for our purpose. Restrictions to overcome the dimensionality problem in this approach are based on an economically intuitive concept and allow for rich spatial and temporal interactions among variables. In particular, we allow for the US to potentially have a dominant in ‡uence on other countries, and we also allow for other (unknown) sources of strong cross-section dependencies besides the dominant US variables.
Neighborhood e¤ects (i.e. lags of other variables entering the relation for a given unit) and an unspeci…ed weak-form cross-section dependence of innovations are also fully accounted for. 1 The distinction between the weak and strong cross-section dependence also helps us to distinguish global shocks (which could originate in the US) from local idiosyncratic shocks. To distinguish between di¤erent types of global shocks, we combine several pieces of information in the form of restrictions on the signs of impulse responses.
The empirical analysis highlights four key …ndings. First, the transmission of liquidity shocks and risk shocks is highly heterogeneous -across countries, across asset classes and over time.
Shocks to liquidity and to risk exhibited much larger e¤ects on asset prices and on capital ‡ows during the 2007-08 …nancial crisis than either in the pre-2007 period or the 2010-11 sovereign debt 1 See Chudik, Tosetti, and Pesaran (2011) for de…nition of weak and strong cross section dependence. 5 crisis, highlighting that these two crises have (so far) been very di¤erent in the way markets have responded. There are also important cross-country di¤erences. EMEs have been a¤ected much more strongly -both in terms of asset prices and capital ‡ows -by shocks during the 2007-08 crisis, often exhibiting a sensitivity to shocks that has been twice as large as that for AEs. By contrast, EME markets did not respond di¤erently to shocks in 2010-11 than in the more tranquil pre-2007 period, suggesting that there has be some de-coupling of EMEs from AEs in 2010 and 2011 relative to previous crises.
Second, the …ndings of the analysis yield clear evidence of a strong geographic ‡ight-to-safety phenomenon during the 2007-08 …nancial crisis, but much less compelling evidence of such a pattern since 2009. For instance, in the 2007-08 crisis a rise in risk triggered not only a decline in bond yields in the US and other AEs, but it raised bond yields in EMEs dramatically, caused an exchange rate depreciation and induced large net capital out ‡ows for EMEs. By contrast, in 2010-11 EME bond yields have hardly responded to such shocks, while the drop in equity returns and portfolio investment in equities and in bonds has been very similar for EMEs as for AEs.
Third, the analysis uncovers an interesting pattern of portfolio choice among investors. An important part of the literature on portfolio choice has been investigating whether investor decisions are driven by a portfolio rebalancing motive (building on the seminal work by Branson and Henderson (1985) ) where market incompleteness and risk induce investors to aim for a stable allocation across assets in their portfolios -thus implying a negative correlation between returns and investment ( ‡ows) into a given asset. On the other hand, another strand of the literature has emphasised the role of a return chasing motive (building on the work by Bohn and Tesar (1996) , and Brennan and Cao (1997) ) which implies a positive correlation between returns and investment of a …nancial asset. The analysis in the present paper …nds evidence for a portfolio rebalancing motive for relatively safe …nancial assets -primarily for bonds in AEs -implying a negative correlation between returns and ‡ows into these assets conditional on shocks to risk. By contrast, there is a mostly positive correlation between returns and ‡ows for relatively more risk assets -portfolio equity assets in AEs and especially EME equities and bonds -akin to a return chasing motive.
We link these …ndings to the ‡ight-to-safety phenomenon observed in particular during the 2007-08 …nancial crisis.
Fourth and …nally, the paper attempts to identify some of the determinants that explain the 6 di¤erences of the transmission of shocks across countries. In particular, we analyze to what extent it was the external exposure -either through trade linkages or through …nancial linkages -and to what extent it was idiosyncratic, country-speci…c characteristics -such as related to countries' macroeconomic fundamentals and perceived riskiness -that made countries vulnerable to di¤erent types of external shocks. For this purpose, we employ a Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) approach of Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) . It combines the averaging of cross-section estimates across models estimated by classical least squares, and is in particular useful for understanding which variables in a large set of potential determinants might have played a role. We …nd that the transmission of risk and liquidity shocks across countries was in ‡uenced by countries' …nancial exposure to the US. As a second set of factors, countries'exposure to liquidity and risk shocks is dependent on the strength of countries'own fundamentals. Those economies with a poor sovereign rating and worse economic and political institutions were substantially more a¤ected by risk and liquidity shocks in both crises. These …ndings have important implications, not just for our understanding of the global transmission of the crisis, but also about what economic policy can do to shield the domestic economy from global shocks.
We stress a number of caveats and limitations to the analysis of the paper. Importantly, we limit our analysis to two types of shocks -shocks to liquidity conditions and to risk -while ignoring other shocks which have been relevant during the two crises. Such shocks may be related to economic activity, the conjunctural situation of a country, or they be related to systemic events such as the collapse of …nancial institutions. Moreover, we limit our analysis to shocks that are mainly global in nature, while we do not investigate the impact of idiosyncratic shocks to any of the 28 economies of the analysis. All these raise interesting and important issues, but ones that go beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper relates to di¤erent strands of the literature. One such strand is the literature on the transmission of the 2007-08 global …nancial crisis, which has given particular prominence to the role of liquidity shocks (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009); Calomiris (2008) and Taylor (2009) ). An emerging literature analyses the global transmission of the crisis and the question through what channels and via which market segments the transmission took place, stressing the relevance of liquidity and …nancial constraints (e.g. Tong and Wei (2009)) or of equity and FX markets (Bekaert et al. (2011 ), Fratzscher (2009 ).
More generally, the issues we address relate closely to a vast literature on modelling the international transmission mechanism in …nancial markets. Important recent work is by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) who propose a spillover index derived from a VAR analysis of a broad set of equity markets, or Dungey and Martin (2007) , Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , Bekaert et al. (2005) who investigate the role of contagion for a broad set of countries and market segments. Ehrmann et al. (2010) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) show that such an international transmission may occur not only within asset classes but also across asset classes. As to the transmission channels, Forbes and Chinn (2004) stress the role of real and trade linkages through which some countries may be more strongly a¤ected by global common or regional shocks, while Fratzscher (2011) highlights that both push factors (such as related to global risk and liquidity conditions) as well as pull factors (country-speci…c fundamentals and institutions) have played an important role in explaining the pattern of global capital ‡ows. Chudik and Fratzscher (2011) also analyse the transmission of global shocks, but their focus is more narrowly on equity and money markets, while excluding exchange rates, bond markets and capital ‡ows from the analysis.
A third strand relates to the methodology and the literature on Global VARs. Pesaran et al. (2004) provided the seminal contribution and proposed a framework for modelling international linkages in a Global VAR setting, which was then applied and extended in a number of papers, including Dées, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007) , Pesaran, Schuermann, and Treutler (2007) , and Pesaran, Smith, and Smith (2007) . Chudik and Pesaran (2011a,b) provided a methodological foundation of the conditional models estimated in a GVAR framework, treating all variables as endogenously determined in one global system. We also follow these latter two papers to specify our models, allowing for a very rich spatio-temporal linkages among markets and economies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical methodology, including the identi…cation of shocks to risk and to liquidity. The various data series and sources are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 then presents the …ndings of the empirical analysis, starting with the results based on the impulse response functions and concluding with the …ndings about the determinants of the global transmission process to di¤erent countries and market segments. Section 5 summarises the main points and concludes.
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A global model of …nancial markets
In this section, we present the empirical methodology employed to analyse the transmission of shocks to liquidity and risk in a large system with a large set of countries. The section also outlines how the impulse response functions are speci…ed and used to analyse the transmission mechanism of shocks.
The model
Let x it denote a vector of k i domestic variables of country i = 1; 2; :::; N in period t = 1; 2; :::; T .
All, domestic and foreign, variables are jointly determined and it is supposed that the vector of all k = P N i=1 k i variables in the global system, denoted as x t = (x 0 1t ; :::; x 0 N t ) 0 , is given by the following factor-augmented VAR model:
where is (large) k k matrix of coe¢ cients, u t = (u 0 1t ; :::; u 0 N t ) 0 is k 1 vector of reduced form errors, is k m matrix of factor loadings, m is (unknown) number of unobserved common factors, and f t is m 1 vector of unobserved common factors given by the following VAR model:
We abstract here in the notation from higher order lags and from deterministic terms to keep the exposition simpler.
Without any loss of generality, denote the US as a country N throughout the paper. Our set of endogenous variables is:
x it = (i it ; r it ; e it ; it ; { it ) 0 , for i = 1; 2; :::; N 1, that is for all economies except the US, and
for the US economy, where i it denotes the …rst di¤erence in long term government bond yields (in country i and period t), r it denotes stock market returns, e it is the nominal e¤ective exchange rate 9 return, it denotes the net capital in ‡ows into bonds markets of country i, { N t denotes the net capital in ‡ows in the stock markets of country i, vix t is the …rst di¤erence in the log of the VIX index, and ted t is the the US ted spread. Thus k i = 5 for i < N , and k N = 7.
Solution to the curse of dimensionality
The drawback of the high-dimensional model (1)- (2) is that the reduced form coe¢ cients cannot be estimated by conventional methods since the number of variables, k, is large (of comparable size to the time dimension), and the number of unknown coe¢ cients grows at a quadratic rate with k. We restore to the method proposed by Chudik and Pesaran (2011a,b) to deal with this proliferation of parameters, also known as the 'curse of dimensionality'problem. In line with this approach, we assume that the coe¢ cient matrix can be partitioned as
where a captures all neighborhood relationships as well as possible (global) dominance of selected variables and is given by
where D is block-diagonal matrix: arise from an error in the speci…cation of spatial weigh matrices in S, see Chudik and Pesaran (2011b) for further details.
The construction of S is crucial in this framework. We construct this matrix based on the following three principles: (i) we allow for dominance of the US variables, that is we do not restrict any of coe¢ cients corresponding to direct contemporaneous or lagged in ‡uence of the US, (ii) own lags of domestic variables are also selected, and …nally (iii) we allow for neighbors in form of spatial weighted averages of foreign trading partners, where the weights are constructed from data on bilateral portfolio holdings. The matrix S = [S 0 i ] is thus given by
; for i = 1; 2; :::; N 1, and
for the US, where E i , for i = 1; 2; :::; N , is k k i selection matrix that selects the vector of domestic variables, in particular E 0 i x t = x it . The US is not assumed to have any neighbors, more on this below. Chudik and Pesaran (2011a,b) establish that under the assumptions discussed above and few other regularity conditions (see Theorem 2 in Chudik and Pesaran (2011b) , and Theorem 1 in Chudik and Pesaran (2011a) ), it is possible to estimate the coe¢ cients corresponding to the neighbors and own lags by Augmented Least Squares (ALS) using the following (augmented) countryspeci…c regressions:
for i = 1; 2; :::; N 1, where the truncation lag q has to be selected as an appropriate increasing function of the sample size. Furthermore,
! 0, as k; q ! 1, and the equation (3) with q ! 1 is large k representation of the variable x it in the high dimensional model given by (1)-(2). It is interesting to highlight that despite one lag assumed in the VAR model (1), the dominant units enter ALS regressions with more lags. The intuition behind this result and the discussion about identi…cation issues in the presence of dominant unit are provided in Chudik and Pesaran (2011b) .
The granular cross-section averages, denoted as x t , are used to take the e¤ects of unobserved common factors into account. The original idea of using the cross section averages to take into account e¤ects of unobserved common factors in the context of panel estimation was proposed by Pesaran (2006) and this idea was later explored in the context of high dimensional VARs by Chudik and Pesaran (2011b) . We simply use the following arithmetic averages:
to take into account the e¤ects of unobserved common factors, which is in general su¢ cient when m does not exceed the dimension of x t , in our case 5.
The dominant unit has to be treated di¤erently from the remaining units, due to its nonnegligible impact on the rest of the system as a whole and the corresponding nonnegligible secondround e¤ect on the dominant unit itself. As suggested by Chudik and Pesaran (2011a) , we estimate the following ALS regression for the US variables:
where the US variables are treated as endogenously determined with the vector of cross section averages. System of estimated equations (3) and (4) turns out to be asymptotically su¢ cient description of the underlying high-dimensional model (1)- (2) for the purpose of impulse response analysis or forecasting. Let us de…ne z t = (x 0 t ; x 0 t ) 0 . Stacking equations (3)-(4) yields the following large VAR model,
where the k + n k + n dimensional coe¢ cient matrices are
, and
Impulse-response analysis
This paper focuses on the impact of global shocks and their transmission across countries, market segments, and time. There are k N + m global shocks in the system (1)- (2), consisting of the k N US innovations in vector u N t and m unobserved common factor innovations in the vector v t . These innovations are spanned by the reduced form errors estimated based on the marginal model (4), provided that m is not larger than the number of cross section averages (k). As a result of the dominance of the US variables, the reduced form innovations u N t and v t are not identi…ed, only the reduced form errors e N t in the marginal model are identi…ed. 2
One possibility to study the implications of the high-dimensional VAR model would be to conduct generalized impulse response analysis. However, generalized impulse response functions cannot be given an economic interpretation, and therefore, we focus on structural impulse responses, as opposed to the generalised impulse responses, in our comparison of the pre-crisis, crisis and postcrisis periods.
Identi…cation of shocks
As explained above, our focus is on the transmission of risk shocks and liquidity shocks to global …nancial markets. In the benchmark speci…cation, risk is proxied through the VIX and liquidity through the US TED spread, as these are the most widely used measures for risk and liquidity 2 See Chudik and Pesaran (2011a) for details.
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conditions, both for the US and globally. Moreover, we analyse how asset prices (equity returns and bond yields), exchange rates and capital ‡ows (into bonds and equities) respond to risk and liquidity shocks. We identify the liquidity shock and the risk shock by imposing a priori knowledge on the behavior of selected …nancial market variables in response to such global shocks. Our identi…cation scheme is in the form of sign restrictions on the impulse responses and combines the schemes used in Chudik and Fratzscher (2011) and Bussiere, Chudik, and Mehl (2011) .
An important question is the separation of liquidity shocks and risk shocks. The short-run sign restrictions imposed for identi…cation stem from the literature of time-varying risk of economic disaster and its impact on asset prices and the business cycle (see e.g. Barro (2006 ), Gabaix (2007 , Gourio (2010) ). Gourio (2010) shows that disaster risk lowers returns of risky …nancial assets (e.g. equities) while increasing the price, i.e. reducing the yield of relatively safer …nancial assets, such as sovereign bonds. Following this argument, we identify shocks to risk as an increase in the VIX coupled with a drop in both US equity returns and US bond yields, and an aprpeciation of save-haven currencies (US dollar, yen and Swiss franc). Importantly, note that no other restrictions are imposed on any of the non-US/foreign variables. By contrast, a shock to liquidity is identi…ed as a rise in the TED spread, together with an increase in US bond yields and a drop in US equity returns. Again, we impose these sign restrictions only on the response of these US variables. 
Data
We now describe the data. Our analysis uses weekly data. Using weekly, rather than lower frequency data has the advantage that it captures better the transmission of shocks in …nancial markets.
14 Moving to higher than weekly frequency is complicated by the non-overlapping trading times across markets, a problem which is reduced by using weekly frequency. as well as to avoid that changes in the comovement across equity markets results from changes in exchange rate comovements. Nominal e¤ective exchange rates are BIS broad (58 country) indices with the exception of the euro, which is based on the ECB de…nition. Table 1 provides a detailed description of the data. Figure A .1 examines comovements in the transformed data -weekly changes in bond yields, weekly returns on stock market indices, and weekly returns on e¤ective exchange rates-using Pesaran's CD test statistics and one year rolling windows. These results shows that (i) the highest co-movement is in stock markets (CD tests are in the range 50-90), followed by bond markets (15-30), while foreign exchange markets commove the least (-5 to + 15). Noting that this statistics is normally distributed under the null of no cross-section dependence, it is clear that these comovements are quite signi…cant; albeit no clearly interpretable time pattern can be depicted from Finally, a fairly novel contribution of the paper is the use of high-frequency data on capital 3 Note that we treat the euro area as a single economy, rather than taking its member states individually.
15 ‡ows, which stems from the data provider EPFR. 4 The data covers weekly net ‡ows of portfolio equity and of bonds for a broad set of advanced and emerging markets, and is based on portfolio decisions of abpout 16,000 equity funds and about 8,000 bond funds. Although EPFR capital folow data captures only about 5-20% of the market capitalization in equity and in bonds for most countries, they have been shown to be strongly correlated with BoP data at lower frequencies.
Hence they constitute good proxies for the overall capital ‡ows for equities and for bonds. The data is transformed into a sample that …ts the purpose of the analysis for the paper. Speci…cally, net capital ‡ows are aggregated at the level of each recipient country.
Findings
This section reports the empirical …ndings. The benchmark estimates of the high-dimensional VAR models are summarized in Subsection 4.1. The subsequent subsection then presents the …ndings from the impulse response analysis, while the …nal subsection reports on the determinants of the di¤erences in the cross-country heterogeneity in the transmission of shocks.
Estimation results for High dimensional VAR models
The estimation results indicate that our high-dimensional VAR models appear to describe the dynamic interactions between markets and countries well. This sub-section reports on a broad range of speci…cation tests.
First, the estimated models are stable. The absolute value of the largest eigenvalue equal 0.59 in pre and post-crisis periods and 0.51 in the crisis period. In all cases it is well below one implying systems are stable. We would expect crisis period to exhibit more persistence compared to the pre and post-crisis periods, due to presumably larger limits to arbitrage during the crisis. Figure A. 2 plots the following measure of overall persistence based on estimated eigenvalues,
, for s = 1; 2; ::,
where P 2 fpre; crisis; postg is subscript denoting the three estimation periods, s is chosen time horizon, b P;j is j-th estimated eigenvalue and n is the number of eigenvalues. According to this measure, overall persistence is very similar in pre-crisis and post-crisis VARs, and slightly more elevated during the crisis, as expected, but the di¤erences between the crisis and the tranquil periods appear quite small.
Second, many of the estimated coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant. A summary of signi…-cance levels for selected groups of coe¢ cients is reported in Table A .2. It is interesting to see that there are lot of similarities across the three estimation periods. The same market contemporaneous cross-section averages are highly signi…cant in 96% cases for stock market, and about 67%-85%
for foreign exchange and bond markets. Cross-section averages from di¤erent markets appear not very important, perhaps with the exception of foreign exchange market during the crisis period (signi…cant in 15% and 22% of countries for bonds and stock markets, respectively). Contemporaneous US variables are also very important within a given market segment. The US exchange rate is found to be important also for stock markets in all three periods, and high rejection rates are found for US bond yields in stock and foreign exchange markets regressions in the crisis period as well. The crisis period seems to have slightly higher rejection rates, possibly indicating a stronger degree of cross-section dependence compared to tranquil periods. Contemporaneous values of VIX and TED have rather small rejection rates (4-11%) with the exception of the TED spread during the crisis (11-26%). Finally, it is interesting that own lags of bond yields are generally important also for other market segments in all periods. This is not the case for the own lags of stock returns and foreign exchange markets.
Third, the signs and magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are intuitive and economically meaningful.
We report a summary of contemporaneous (short-run) elasticities in Fourth, the …t of conditional models is generally high and driven mostly by the contemporaneous cross-section dependence. At the same time, the marginal models have a relatively low …t. Table   A .4 reports a summary of adjusted R 2 . Looking at the marginal stock markets models (US & CS averages), the …t is negligible, between -4% to +3% in the tranquil periods and slightly larger 6%-10% in the crisis periods. Marginal foreign exchange market models have also a low …t in the range -3% to 5% with the exception of the post-crisis period. Two patterns emerge from bottom part of Table A .4. On the one hand, AE bond and stock markets have a higher …t compared to emerging markets in all estimation periods, by a large margin -about 8 to 30 percentage points. Since the …t of the marginal models is driven mainly by contemporaneous cross-section dependence, this suggests that the degree of cross-section dependence in bond and stock markets across advanced economies is higher than in emerging markets, where idiosyncratic shocks are perhaps more important.
Last but not least, the examination of model residuals does not reveal any important irregularities. 5
Impulse response functions and variance decomposition
We now turn to the benchmark results based on the impulse responses functions discussed in 18 results for shocks to liquidity.
FIGURES A.3-A.22
Given the many elements of the estimates, we organise the discussion of the results along three dimensions -a magni…cation e¤ect analysing the changes in the strength of the transmission across di¤ erent time periods, a rebalancing e¤ect highlighting di¤erences across countries, and a composition e¤ect focusing on changes in portfolio allocations across asset classes.
Magni…cation e¤ ect
A …rst striking empirical …nding is the much stronger e¤ect of shocks to liquidity and to risk on virtually all variables -asset prices, exchange rates and capital ‡ows -during the 2007-08 …nancial crisis. For many of the variables, the e¤ects of risk and liquidity shocks are twice as large in 2007-08 than in other periods, highlighting that not only risk increased and liquidity contracted dramatically during that period, but that the sensitivity of …nancial markets and investors to a given shock rose substantially.
By contrast, no such systematic increase seems to be present in the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis. In fact, it is striking that the response of EME bond yields and EME capital ‡ows to risk and liquidity shocks in the 2009-11 period seems to be muted, exhibiting a similar or even weaker response pattern than even during the more tranquil 2005-07 pre-crisis period. The responses of AEs to such shocks is also mostly lower in the 2009-11 period than the 2007-08 crisis, but this reduction is generally much smaller than for EMEs. Hence, overall, a …rst key result is that the transmission process of liquidity and risk shocks during the sovereign debt crisis is fundamentally di¤erent from the 2007-08 …nancial crisis. Although EMEs are still generally more a¤ected by a given shock in 2009-11, the e¤ects of shocks have become a lot more similar across countries.
Rebalancing e¤ ect
The IRFs show that shocks both to risk and to liquidity generally induce a rebalancing out of EMEs and into AEs, and in particular into the US. Most striking and visible is this …nding for the response of equity ‡ows, which in some cases exhibit net in ‡ows to the US and mostly massive out ‡ows out of EMEs in response to shocks. 6 Consistent with this picture of rebalancing in capital ‡ows is the response of asset prices and exchange rates. Most importantly, a positive shock to risk raises bond yields in EMEs but lowers them in most AEs. What is striking is that the sensitivity of bond yields of AEs to risk shocks is largest not during the 2007-08 crisis -as it is for EME yields -but during the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis. This increase in sensitivity is most visible for the US, Switzerland, Norway and the UK. 7
The same opposite signs in the sensitivity to risk and liquidity shocks across countries is observed for exchange rates. Several AE currencies rise in response to shocks to risk and liquidity, while EME currencies depreciate. What appears to be most striking for the response of exchange rates is the high degree of heterogeneity across countries. For AEs, safe-haven currencies such as the US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc appreciate the most, while commodity currencies, such as the Overall, the evidence on the rebalancing e¤ects across countries strongly points towards a ‡ight-to-safety phenomenon of investors, where in response to adverse shocks to liquidity and in particular to risk capital is withdrawn from countries and markets that are perceived to be relatively less safe and are repatriated to those that are considered safer. Not only the response in portfolio ‡ows, but also the response of asset prices and the exchange rate is fully consistent with this hypothesis.
Importantly, such a ‡ight-to-safety phenomenon appears to be particularly strong during the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis for some AEs.
Composition e¤ ect
A third dimension is to take an investor perspective and analyse how shocks to risk and liquidity a¤ect the portfolio choice of investors across di¤erent asset classes. As discussed in the Introduction, a large literature has analysed to what extent and under what circumstances it is a portfolio rebalancing motive or a return chasing motive that drives investment decisions. The correlation pattern across responses of returns on …nancial asset, on the one hand, and ‡ows, on the other, allow us to gauge which of these motives is dominant and during which periods. .3-A.22 . It is important to recall that for bonds we measure the reaction of yields, rather than of returns, to risk and liquidity shocks. A decline in the yield of a particular bond , for instance, implies a rise in the price and hence a positive return of that bond. For the purpose of the discussion on portfolio choice, we therefore focus here on the return dimension.
The key …nding of such an analysis is that a portfolio rebalancing motive appears to dominate for relatively safe …nancial assets -primarily for bonds in AEs -as the IRFs for these exhibit a negative correlation between returns and ‡ows conditional on shocks to risk. By contrast, there is a mostly positive correlation between returns and ‡ows for relatively more risky assets -portfolio equity assets in AEs and especially EME equities and bonds -a pattern suggesting the dominance of a return chasing motive.
In more detail, for EMEs, regard to EMEs appears to exhibit a strong positive relation between returns and ‡ows, which suggest a return chasing motive being the dominant driver for such investments. In contrast, for investments AE bond and FX markets, there is a negative relation between returns and net ‡ows conditional on risk shocks.
As a …nal note, A.23-A.27 show the variance decomposition for risk shocks. The most important point here is that risk shocks explain quite a substantial share of the movements in asset prices, exchange rates and capital ‡ows. There appear to be no systematic di¤erences across country groups or time periods, underlining the points of the previous sub-section that our VAR speci…cation indeed performs well for a broad set of countries and time periods.
FIGUREs A. 23-A.27 In summary, the results reveal some striking changes in the global transmission of risk and liquidity shocks, both over time and across countries. Importantly, the transmission process during the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis appears to have been fundamentally di¤erent from the 2007-08 …nancial crisis -the shock transmission has become much more similar across countries, with
EMEs no longer being most exposed to adverse shocks to global liquidity and risk. Moreover, the transmission pattern we have discovered stresses the importance of a ‡ight-to-safety phenomenon, which has become stronger during the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis, in particular with a rise in risk driving down bond yields in key AEs.
Determinants of cross-country di¤erences in the transmission of shocks
The previous section has highlighted that there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity across countries in the response patterns to global risk shocks. This section analyses what factors may help explain this cross-country heterogeneity.
To shed light on the cross-section heterogeneity in the transmission of the global shocks to the rest of the world, we estimate the following cross-section regression is the contemporaneous impact of a global shock a (to risk or liquidity) on the stock market, the foreign exchange market or the money market of country i, and x i`f or i = 1; :::; N 1 and`= 1; 2; :::; K is the set of K fundamentals speci…c to country i.
We focus on two alternative explanations for why a country may respond more or less strongly to a given US-speci…c shock than other countries. A …rst potential explanation is the direct exposure to the US economy, either through trade or through …nancial linkages. One would expect that countries with more trade with the US (relative to domestic GDP, or to total trade) or with stronger …nancial linkages are a¤ected more strongly, as the crisis in the US should set o¤ a decline in US import demand and a repatriation of capital to the US. An alternative explanation is that the global shock transmission may depend on the strength of country-speci…c fundamentals. This implies that during a crisis, investors may not withdraw capital indiscriminately, but may focus on those with weaker fundamentals and less resilience to external shocks.
Hence, our set of regressors includes both the country-speci…c macro variables (such as the current account, reserves, trade openness, …nancial integration), country-speci…c institutional variables (the quality of the institutions) and also bilateral trade and …nancial debt and equity exposures to the United States. A full list is provided in Table 2 . We run three di¤erent BACE estimations, one for each period (the periods before during and after the crisis). Summary of the importance of individual fundamentals in explaining the transmission process is reported in Table A .5. This table reports posterior inclusion probabilities and value larger than 50% indicates that the fundamental might have played a role in explaining the cross section heterogeneity. Overall, the results provide evidence that real or …nancial exposure to the US has played a substantial role in explaining the global transmission of the crisis. By contrast, the quality of institutions and domestic fundamentals -such as the size of reserves and the sovereign 23 rating -appear to have been relevant as well.
We stress that this evidence is no more than illustrative as our analysis here is conducted purely in the cross-section, and the size of our cross-section is limited to the 28 economies in our sample. Nevertheless, these points help illustrate the heterogeneity and some of the sources of the heterogeneity in the global transmission process.
Conclusions
The global economy and global capital markets have become increasingly integrated and interdependent over the past decade. The purpose of this paper has been to understand the global transmission process of important shocks during crisis periods -shocks to liquidity and to riskacross di¤erent …nancial market segments for a broad set of 28 advanced and emerging economies.
The paper has used a relatively novel empirical methodology, building on the growing literature on high-dimensional VARs, which speci…cally takes into account the rich dimensionality of this multi-country and multi-market setting.
The speci…c interest of the empirical analysis of the paper has been to understand the changes in the transmission process over time. A key …nding highlights the di¤erence between the 2007-08 …nancial crisis and the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis. Shocks during the 2007-08 crisis were transmitted much more strongly and in a much more heterogeneous fashion, with EMEs being a¤ected substantially more strongly than AEs -with both asset returns and capital ‡ow responses being consistent with a clear and persistent ‡ight-to-safety pattern from the former to the latter.
By contrast, the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis has been di¤erent in that a ‡ight-to-safety pattern has been observed across asset classes rather than between EMEs and AEs, with bond markets of a few select AEs experiencing a marked drop in yields in response to risk shocks. In particular, Figure A .12: Cumulative impact of one unit risk shock on equity ‡ows after 4 weeks in di¤erent countries with 25%-75% bootstrap bounds. 
